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When the “Hard Look” Is Soft:                 
Reconciling Center for Biological Diversity v. 
Department of the Interior Within Ninth Circuit 
Environmental Precedent 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A man is forcefully arrested for choosing plastic bags instead of 
paper. A home is raided when a search reveals a battery discarded in 
the curbside trash can. An “eco check” road block has officers 
inspecting the emissions of each car. These events might sound 
surreal and that is simply because they are unreal. They are all part of 
a recent satirical car commercial.1 This Orwellian vision of strict 
environmental enforcement by the “Green Police” ends with the 
promotion of the manufacturer’s new clean diesel car. But with an 
initial viewing audience of over 115 million people,2 a fair amount of 
controversy over this commercial has arisen on both sides of the 
“green” movement.3 In particular, many seem concerned with the 
notion of an environmental police body.  
However, environmental regulations already exist on both 
individual actions—though not as extreme as depicted in this 
commercial—and on larger scale utilization of natural resources. 
These regulations are meaningless, however, without some means of 
enforcement. So, whether the commercial is amusing or alarming, it 
does tease out an important issue: namely, how are actions with 
environmental impacts actually policed? 
Natural resources do not police themselves. Governmental 
agencies have been created and developed, each with a specific focus, 
in order to guarantee proper utilization and protection of resources 
considered to be held in the public domain. As such, natural 
 
 1. Audi Green Police: Protecting and Conserving Earth, http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v= Wq58zS4_jvM (last visited Sept. 14, 2010). 
 2. Doritos Super Bowl Spot was Most Watched Ad of All-Time, NIELSEN WIRE, Feb. 9, 
2010, http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/media_entertainment/doritos-super-bowl-spot-
was-the-most-watched-ad-of-all-time  . 
 3. Wendy Koch, Audi’s “Green Police” Super Bowl Ad Stirs Controversy, USA TODAY, 
Feb. 8, 2010, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/greenhouse/post/2010/02/ 
audis-green-police-ad-stirs-controversy/1. 
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resources are not only typically under public ownership, but must 
also be administered in accordance with the best interest of the 
public. But the public’s best interest does not necessarily equate to 
maintaining undisturbed resources. Agencies will sell, lease, or 
exchange land to private ownership for protection of critically 
important lands for wildlife or public access, for a balanced method 
of land management, to generate funding for other land under a 
“land for land” principle, and to generate additional funding for land 
conservation.4  
While environmental protection groups are quick to scrutinize 
these agency actions, it is not moral beliefs or ideological values that 
police these uses of natural resources. Instead, statutorily imposed 
procedural requirements are the mechanisms that police the actions 
of the agencies, ensuring that any actions with environmental 
impacts comport with what Congress has established to be the best 
interest of the public.5 Challenges from environmental protection 
groups are therefore not based simply on the merits of the action. 
Rather, such challenges must be based on an agency’s compliance 
with these statutorily imposed procedural requirements.6 Moreover, 
ensuing judicial review of agency action is consequently limited to 
evaluation of these statutory requirements alone.7 It cannot simply 
be argued that an agency action is bad or even unpopular. Natural 
resources suits brought by environmental interest groups, most often 
before the Ninth Circuit, are based on violations of procedural 
mechanisms in the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),8 the  
National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”),9 the Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act (“FLPMA”),10 and the National 
 
 4. See Federal Land Transaction Facilitation Act, Pub. L. No. 106-248, 114 Stat. 598 
(2000).  
 5. Although “what is best for the public” could easily be debated given the context, 
Congress was concerned with “the critical importance of restoring and maintaining 
environmental quality to the overall welfare and development of man” with the creation of the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2009). 
 6. See Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443, 1448 (9th 
Cir. 1996). 
 7. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2009) (allowing the 
reviewing court to set aside agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
or otherwise not in accordance with law”). 
 8. E.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Evans, 316 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 9. E.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Rey, 526 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 10. E.g., United States v. Carpenter, 526 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2008); Klamath Siskiyou 
Wildlands Ctr. v. Boody, 468 F.3d 549 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).11 The requirements imposed 
by these statutes police agency actions and thus ultimately police the 
use of natural resources. 
In Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Department of 
the Interior,12 a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit was asked by 
environmental interest groups to rein in federal agency action that 
violated the procedural requirements of federal statutes, specifically 
NEPA. The sufficiency of the Bureau of Land Management’s 
(“BLM”) Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) was called into 
question and the three-judge panel majority agreed with the 
environmental groups and found that the BLM had violated the 
requirements of NEPA by not fully evaluating the alternatives when 
preparing its EIS.13 The outcome was surprising because the Ninth 
Circuit had seemingly reset deference in favor of agency actions just 
one year earlier in Lands Council v. McNair.14 In that case the court 
established that a ‘hard look’ requires only a fair discussion of 
impacts and that the court owes deference to agencies and their 
methodologies on technical and scientific matters. Petitions have 
already been filed for Center for Biological Diversity to be reheard by 
the Ninth Circuit en banc in hopes of correcting what some see as an 
inappropriate deviation by the panel.15 But while the majority 
holding in this case may at first seem incongruent with the Ninth 
Circuit’s precedent, closer examination shows that this is an 
appropriate and fitting refinement of the court’s analysis of agency 
actions. It serves as further clarification on the role of the judiciary in 
ensuring that agencies take the requisite “hard look” at 
environmental impact and—if the petition is granted—should be 
affirmed by the en banc court. 
This Note will proceed by first giving background and contextual 
information regarding judicial evaluation of agency actions, 
 
 11. E.g., Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 541 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2008); WildWest 
Institute v. Bull, 547 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2008); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest 
Serv., 349 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 12. 581 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2009).  
 13. Id. at 1077. 
 14. 537 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 15. Petition for rehearing en banc by the Ninth Circuit was filed by Asarco LLC, joint 
party with the Department of the Interior, on October 29, 2009, and is still currently pending 
decision. MSLF—Legal Cases, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 
Mountain States Legal Foundation, http://www.mountainstateslegal.org/legal_cases.cfm? 
legalcaseid=215 (last visited Sept. 14, 2010).  
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specifically cases coming from the Ninth Circuit and falling under 
NEPA. This background and context will be fairly extensive in order 
to properly frame the Ninth Circuit’s evolving balance of deference 
given and demand required of agencies on matters of environmental 
impact analysis leading up to Center for Biological Diversity. Part III 
will discuss the facts and the procedural history and then turn to 
analysis of the majority’s reasoning behind overturning the BLM’s 
proposed land exchange and Judge Tallman’s staunch challenge of 
the majority opinion as an unusable legal standard and contradictory 
to the Ninth’s Circuit’s en banc decision in Lands Council. Part IV 
discusses how the decision in Center for Biological Diversity can be 
viewed not only as congruent with the precedent in Lands Council 
but suggests that Center for Biological Diversity serves as a 
clarification of what constitutes a hard look at the environmental 
consequences of agency action across all manner of natural resources. 
Finally, Part V will conclude with a summary of the significance that 
can be taken from decision in Center for Biological Diversity. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S GRAPPLE                     
WITH AGENCY ACTIONS 
Federally owned lands constitute an average of 47.5% of the land 
within the states of the Ninth Circuit compared to an average of 
9.1% in all other states.16 As a result, the Ninth Circuit continues its 
historic role as the predominant venue for matters related to publicly 
owned lands and agency actions affecting those lands.17 In order to 
properly frame an understanding of the significance and relevance of 
Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Department of the 
Interior, the requirements of NEPA and several cases ought to be 
discussed as either foundational elements of Ninth Circuit precedents 
or as specific cases cited in the majority and dissenting opinions of 
Center for Biological Diversity.18 
 
 16. Carol Hardy Vincent et al., Federal Land Management Agencies: Background on 
Land and Resources Management, in FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT: CURRENT ISSUES AND 
BACKGROUND 42 (Samuel T. Prescott ed., 1998). 
 17. See DAVID C. FREDERICK, RUGGED JUSTICE: THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF 
APPEALS AND THE AMERICAN WEST, 1891–1941, at 98 (1994). 
 18. The cases presented are not intended to be an exhaustive study, but rather to 
demonstrate several key instances of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling on agency actions involving 
NEPA and impact statements. 
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NEPA is the most fundamental statutory safeguard against 
improper impacts of natural resources administration.19 In order to 
safeguard and protect the environment and our natural resources for 
the benefit of the public, NEPA contains several procedural 
requirements that agencies must follow in order to commence any 
action that might have environmental impact. The first of these 
requirements is the performance of an Environmental Assessment 
(“EA”), which is primarily focused on assessing the likely 
environmental issues that surround the proposed action or project 
and whether there is likely to be any significant environmental 
impact.20 If there is a finding of “significant impact” the agency must 
then prepare a draft Environmental Impact Statement (“DEIS” or 
simply “EIS”) that, once published, opens up the action to public 
comment and inquiry. Following this public inquiry, the agency will 
prepare a Final Environmental Impact Statement (“final EIS”), 
which includes modifications based on the discussion of the draft 
EIS, before issuing its Record of Decision (“ROD”), which provides 
the agency’s final conclusions and its plans moving forward. 
Understanding the manner in which the courts have reviewed this 
process—specifically the evaluation of alternatives—is integral in 
understanding the framing of Center for Biological Diversity. The 
decision in Center for Biological Diversity is built upon the 
foundation of the following cases. 
A. Alternatives Are Required for a Complete EIS: Methow Valley 
Citizens Council v. Regional Forester 
In preparation for the development and operation of a ski resort, 
Methow Recreation, Inc. applied for a special use permit from the 
United States Forest Service (“USFS”) to utilize national forest land 
in conjunction with adjacent private land to construct the resort.21 
Suit was brought by a citizens council challenging the granting of 
the permit as failing to meet the requirements of NEPA, specifically a 
failure of the EIS to include plans for mitigation and a “worst case 
analysis.”22 A three-judge Ninth Circuit panel agreed, holding that 
 
 19. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (describing NEPA as “our basic national charter for protection 
of the environment”). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Reg’l Forester, 833 F.2d 810, 812 (9th Cir. 
1987) 
 22. Id. at 813. 
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the EIS prepared by the USFS did not meet the requirements of 
NEPA because a “worst case analysis” was required.23 
The Supreme Court eventually reversed the Ninth Circuit in 
Roberston v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,24 holding that an EIS 
does not require a mitigation plan or a “conjectural ‘worst case 
analysis.’”25 Moreover, NEPA does not require selection of a more 
environmentally preferable alternative or mandate specific results 
“but simply prescribes the necessary process.”26 In fact, it can be 
argued that the Supreme Court’s holding in Roberston effectively 
eliminated the prospect of interpreting NEPA as having “any 
substantive mandate in protecting the environment.”27 However, the 
Court did not address the Ninth Circuit’s holding on the evaluation 
of the underlying need fulfilled by the action.28 By evaluating only 
the single parcel as a potential site for the ski resort, and focusing all 
alternatives in the EIS solely on this parcel,29 the USFS failed to 
present a complete EIS that properly presented sufficient alternatives 
to meet the underlying public need.30 
B. The “Hard Look” in Blue Mountain                              
Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood 
Following an unprecedented wildfire in the Umatilla National 
Forest region of Oregon, the USFS awarded several contracts for 
salvage logging operations in the considerable acreage affected by 
the wildfire.31 The salvage logging project called for the creation of 
 
 23. Id. at 817. 
 24. 490 U.S. 332 (1989). 
 25. Id. at 355 (quoting 50 Fed. Reg 32237 (1985)); see also DIORI L. KRESKE, 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR AGENCIES, CITIZENS, AND 
CONSULTANTS 162 (1996). 
 26. Roberston, 490 U.S. at 350. 
 27. CHARLES H. ECCLESTON, THE NEPA PLANNING PROCESS: A COMPREHENSIVE 
GUIDE WITH EMPHASIS ON EFFICIENCY 304 (1999). 
 28. Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Reg’l Forester, 879 F.2d 705, 705 (9th Cir. 
1989); see also O.L. Schmidt, The Statement of Underlying Need Determines the Range of 
Alternatives in an Environmental Document, in ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS: THE NEPA 
EXPERIENCE 47 (Stephen G. Hildebrand & Johnnie B. Cannon eds., 1993). 
 29. Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Reg’l Forester, 833 F.2d 810, 815 n.7 (9th Cir. 
1987). 
 30. Schmidt, supra note 28, at 47. 
 31. Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1210 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
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several miles of both reconstructed and new roads.32 Subsequently, a 
suit was brought by an environmental group to enjoin the USFS due 
to a failure to complete an EIS as required by NEPA.33 The USFS 
had completed an EA of the project and then gave a “Finding of No 
Significant Impact” assessment.34 As a result, the USFS declined to 
create an EIS. The court held that the USFS had in fact failed to take 
the “hard look” at the ramifications of the timber project as required 
by NEPA.35 
The court made clear in this case that, in its review of these types 
of agency actions, the court looks for evidence of more than just 
“cursory” investigation into environmental impacts. The USFS’s EA 
for the logging project was inadequate in part because it contained 
only “general statements about ‘possible’ effects and ‘some risk’” 
and these statements “do not constitute a ‘hard look’ absent a 
justification regarding why more definitive information could not be 
provided.”36 Also an important factor considered by courts is the 
persuasiveness of the EA. Here, the USFS assessment “simply 
fail[ed] to persuade that no significant impacts would result from the 
[proposed] project.”37 This is not to say that an EA or an EIS is to 
be evaluated exclusively on persuasion, but rather suggests that the 
court take into account the information presented in assessments and 
statements issued by the agencies and make an evaluation on the 
sufficiency of the content. It is not a hard look simply because an 
agency says there is no significant impact. 
C. The “No Action” Alternative: Friends of Southeast’s             
Future v. Morrison 
In 1991, the USFS developed a “Tentative Operating Schedule” 
for the sale of timber from national forest lands in the Alaska area.38 
The tentative schedule proposed seven logging projects, which 
included a project on Ushk Bay. The USFS issued a notice of intent 
to prepare an EIS for Ushk Bay in May 1992, completed a draft EIS 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 1211. 
 34. Id. at 1210. 
 35. Id. at 1216. 
 36. Id. at 1213 (quoting Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest Serv., 137 F.3d 
1372, 1380 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Friends of Se.’s Future v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 1998). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/26/2010  6:33:29 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
972 
in June 1992, and released a final EIS in September 1994.39 In the 
final EIS, five alternatives were proposed for the Ushk Bay timber 
sale, but all alternatives only varied the size of the timber harvest.40 
And while the final EIS “considered a ‘no-action’ alternative,” 
ultimately this alternative was not adopted because “it would not 
meet the purpose and need of the project.”41 Following the Forest 
Supervisor’s ROD, an environmental interest group filed suit 
claiming that the USFS violated both NFMA and NEPA by not 
issuing an EIS with its original tentative schedule and by 
inappropriately excluding discussion of a no action alternative in the 
final EIS.42 While the Ninth Circuit did ultimately find the USFS in 
violation of NFMA, it did not find the USFS to have violated NEPA 
requirements with regard to either the timeliness of the first EIS or 
the failure to include a no action alternative in the final EIS.43 
Two important factors come from the court’s decision in this 
case. The first is the role of a no action alternative in the drafting of 
an EIS. The court is explicit in its expectation for complete 
consideration of alternatives within an EIS, particularly since “[t]he 
existence of reasonable but unexamined alternatives renders an EIS 
inadequate.”44 Moreover, the “informed and meaningful 
consideration of alternatives—including the no action alternative—
is . . . an integral part of” NEPA’s design.45  
Nevertheless, merely having a brief treatment or discussion of a 
no action alternative “does not suggest that it has been insufficiently 
addressed.”46 Thus, an EIS must include discussion and 
consideration of a no action alternative to be adequate under NEPA, 
yet the court is not willing to require such an alternative to be given 
a specific amount of discussion or contemplation. This would almost 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 1062. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1070–71. 
 44. Id. at 1065. 
 45. Id. (quoting Bob Marshall Alliance v. Hodel, 852 F.2d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir. 
1988)). 
 46. Id. (quotation omitted); see also Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 914 
F.2d 1174, 1181 (9th Cir. 1990); Oregon Natural Res. Council v. Lyng, 882 F.2d 1417, 
1423 n.5 (1989), amended, 899 F.2d 1565 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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suggest that any consideration of a no action alternative could be 
sufficient.47 
The second factor from the court’s decision in Friends is again 
the issue of the underlying purpose and need of the project, a factor 
the Ninth Circuit found important in Methow and which the 
Supreme Court left untouched in its subsequent reversal.48 In the 
evaluation of an EIS’s treatment of a no action alternative, the court 
pays particular attention to the “purpose [or] need of the project.”49 
A challenge to the sufficiency of a no action alternative often derives 
from a claim that the underlying need and purpose of the project are 
too narrowly defined by the agency, effectively precluding any 
possibility of no action and thereby eliminating non-action from 
discussion.50 The court gives considerable discretion to agencies in 
defining the scope of the need or purpose of a project,51 but that 
discretion “is not unlimited.”52 In fact, the court reaffirmed its earlier 
observation that “an agency cannot define its objectives in 
unreasonably narrow terms.”53  
Allowing for “unreasonably narrow” purposes or objectives 
would effectively allow agencies to circumvent the EIS mechanism 
required by NEPA.54 In the end, the court made its decision based 
on an evaluation of the reasonableness of rejecting a no action 
alternative in light of the scope of the underlying purpose and need 
of the project. Therefore, the underlying purpose of a proposal is 
 
 47. Friends, 153 F.3d at 1065. 
 48. Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Reg’l Forester, 879 F.2d 705, 706 (9th Cir. 
1989) (“The Supreme Court . . . reversed only in part the decision of this court. The other 
parts of this court’s decision regarding the EIS were neither challenged by the Forest Service 
nor considered by the Supreme Court.”). 
 49. Friends, 153 F.3d at 1067 (looking specifically to the reasonableness of the purpose 
and need of the project). 
 50. Id. at 1066. 
 51. Id.; see also City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 52. Friends, 153 F.3d at 1066. 
 53. Id. (quoting City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 123 F.3d 1142, 
1155 (9th Cir. 1997)). In support of this original assertion on agency definition of objective, 
the court also cited to the opinion of then-Judge Thomas, in which he stated: 
[A]n agency may not define the objectives of its action in terms so unreasonably 
narrow that only one alternative from among the environmentally benign ones in 
the agency’s power would accomplish the goals of the agency’s action, and the EIS 
would become a foreordained formality. 
Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1991), 502 U.S. 
994 (1991). 
 54. See City of New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 715 F.2d 732, 743 (2d Cir. 1983). 
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essential to assessing the agency’s treatment of a no action 
alternative. 
D. Skeptic Judiciary: Ecology Center, Inc. v. Austin 
In 2000, during the aftermath of the Lolo National Forest 
wildfires, the USFS set about to design a post-burn project and first 
prepared the required EIS, which included four detailed alternatives 
including the necessary no action alternative.55 By July 2002, USFS 
selected a modified version of one such alternative that would 
involve commercial thinning of certain timber and controlled 
burning in old-growth area forest, as well as logging of insect-killed 
and burnt timber throughout the forest.56 An environmental group, 
Ecology Center, filed suit against USFS, in part for the failure to 
satisfy NEPA’s EIS requirement.57 The court held that “[t]he EIS 
did not address in any meaningful way the various uncertainties 
surrounding the scientific evidence”58 and the EIS “discusses in 
detail only the [agency’s] own reasons for proposing” the project.59 
Additionally, the court held that the USFS violated NEPA by failing 
“to either adequately explain its impact assessment or provide the 
information that is necessary to understand and evaluate” the 
agency’s decision.60 
While Ecology was subsequently overruled in Lands Council v. 
McNair,61 the decision remains useful in understanding the evolving 
role of scientific evidence in the court’s evaluation of EIS based 
violations of NEPA. First, the court clearly weighed heavily the 
adequacy of the agency’s scientific basis in the preparation of an 
EIS.62 Additionally, this case demonstrates that the court reasoned 
that an agency must either adequately explain its EIS or provide the 
information necessary to understand and evaluate its decision in 
order to meet the EIS requirement of NEPA.63 While the role of the 
 
 55. Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 1061, 1065. 
 58. Id. at 1065 (quoting Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 
1993)). 
 59. Ecology Ctr., 430 F.3d at 1065. 
 60. Id. at 1068. 
 61. 537 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 62. Ecology Ctr., 430 F.3d at 1066–67. 
 63. Id. at 1067. 
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judiciary as an overseer and critic of the scientific evidence behind 
agency action was a large step, this role would not last terribly long. 
E. Lands Council v. McNair 
In 2002, the USFS decided to proceed with arrangements for 
management activities, consisting of a selective logging project, in a 
large region of the Idaho Panhandle National Forest.64 Subsequently, 
the USFS issued a draft EIS, final EIS, and finally a ROD in June 
2004 that upheld the project, but in light of a then-recent Ninth 
Circuit decision65 the USFS issued a supplemental EIS and revised 
ROD in 2006.66 An environmental group filed suit for preliminary 
injunction after the USFS denied its administrative appeal to stop the 
project.67  
A three-judge panel of the court originally ruled in favor of the 
environmental group, holding that the group was likely to succeed in 
claiming that the USFS violated NEPA by failing to “include a full 
discussion of the scientific uncertainty surrounding its strategy for” 
the project68 and because the EIS was based on an assumption that 
the proposed project was inherently beneficial.69 However, a petition 
for rehearing en banc was granted and the Ninth Circuit, sitting en 
banc, vacated the panel and affirmed the district court’s ruling in 
favor of the USFS.70 
The court’s en banc decision hinged on a reversal of Ecology 
Center, and the court pointed out several ways in which that 
majority opinion erred. One error was creating a requirement of 
 
 64. Lands Council v. McNair, 494 F.3d 771, 774 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d en banc, 537 
F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 65. Lands Council v. Powell, 379 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2004), amended, 395 F.3d 1019 
(9th Cir. 2005). 
 66. McNair, 494 F.3d at 775. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 778. 
 69. Id. (citing Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. Austin 430 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
 70. McNair, 537 F.3d at 1005. It should be noted that Judge Milan D. Smith Jr. was a 
member on both the three-judge panel in the original Ninth Circuit hearing and the rehearing 
en banc. Judge Smith’s concurring opinion in the panel hearing of this case is reluctant at best. 
He asserts that the decision in Ecology Center was “erroneously decided,” that he is bound to 
the opinion’s reasoning and holding, which “perpetuates the majority’s faulty reasoning in 
Ecology Center,” and “if the occasion arises” he would like to reverse the holding in Ecology 
Center. McNair, 494 F.3d at 781–82, 784. It would seem that his wish was granted, as Judge 
Smith was the author of the en banc opinion and was able to personally ensure that the 
majority’s opinion in Ecology Center was thoroughly eviscerated.  
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agencies that was not based on any relevant regulation or statute.71 
The hard look requirement imposed by NEPA does not require 
specific substantive steps by the agency—steps that would be subject 
to review by a court.72 Instead, the en banc court held that an agency 
“has taken the requisite ‘hard look’” when the EIS includes the 
components outlined in 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 and the agency provides 
“a full and fair discussion of environmental impacts.”73 Therefore, 
agencies do not need to affirmatively present every possible 
uncertainty in an EIS in order to take a “hard look” and be in 
compliance with NEPA.74 
Another point of error in Ecology Center, as noted by the court, 
was the proper deference the court owes agencies and the 
methodologies they use.75 The en banc court disapproved of the 
judiciary’s increasing involvement in evaluating the scientific and 
technical aspects of agency actions.76 The court returned to a review 
of agency action limited only to whether the action is “arbitrary and 
capricious” in nature.77  
Moreover, the court asserted that this return to limited review 
was in line with “law that requires [the court] to defer to an agency’s 
determination in an area involving a ‘high level of technical 
expertise,’” particularly because the court consists most definitely of 
“non-scientists.”78 Nevertheless, the court reaffirmed that agencies 
must “acknowledge and respond to” questions of scientific 
uncertainty.79 Therefore, a court is now to afford agencies the 
appropriate deference, particularly in matters of scientific evaluation 
of impact. The court did not, however, close the door on the need 
for agencies to respond to and address concerns over uncertainties in 
the EIS in harmony with NEPA’s regulations.80 
 
 71. McNair, 537 F.3d at 991. 
 72. Id. at 992. 
 73. Id. at 1001. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 991. 
 76. Id. at 993. 
 77. Id.; see also Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989); Ecology 
Ctr., Inc. v. Austin 430 F.3d 1057, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005) (McKeown, J., dissenting). 
 78. McNair, 537 F.3d at 993. 
 79. Id. at 1001. 
 80. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1(b), 1502.9(a), 1503.4(a), 1502.22. 
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III. CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. DEPARTMENT                
OF THE INTERIOR 
A. Facts 
In 1994, Asarco LLC (“Asarco”), which operates the Ray Mine 
complex in south central Arizona, proposed to the BLM a land 
exchange that would allow for the consolidation of holdings and 
expanded development of mining operations.81 The land exchange 
would convey to Asarco thirty-one parcels of public land (“selected 
lands”) in fee simple and the BLM would receive eighteen parcels of 
private land (“offered lands”) in return.82 Nearly 75% of the selected 
lands were owned by the United States and administered by the 
BLM, with the remaining 25% of the selected lands being owned and 
administered as split estates.83 These selected lands also provided a 
variety of vital plant and wildlife habitat, were in close proximity to 
an area of “Critical Environmental Concern,” and contained several 
archeological sites suitable for registration.84 
Both Asarco and the BLM directly asserted five foreseeable uses 
of the selected lands: existing mining, production and support areas, 
transition, intermittent use, and long-range prospecting.85 The 
selected lands were also encumbered by a total of 751 mining claims 
in accordance with the Mining Law of 1872, which included 747 
claims held by Asarco.86 Although every parcel except one was 
encumbered by at least one mining claim, these claims were 
unpatented and their validity had yet to be determined by the 
BLM.87  
In the period from 1995 to 1997, the BLM consulted with 
numerous entities regarding the proposed land exchange before 
publishing a DEIS in the latter part of 1998.88 Upon review of the 
DEIS in 1999, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) sent 
 
 81. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Dep’t of Interior, 581 F.3d 1063, 1065–66 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
 82. Id. at 1066. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 1066–67. 
 86. Id. at 1067. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. (citing consultation with “federal, state, and local agencies, elected 
representatives, nongovernmental organizations, tribal governments, and private individuals”). 
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a letter supplemented by thirteen pages of comments to the BLM 
asserting that the DEIS “did not appear to have evaluated all 
reasonable alternatives and strongly recommended that additional 
information regarding the alternatives be included in the DEIS.”89 
Moreover, the EPA contended that “all reasonable alternatives have 
not been evaluated and that impacts of foreseeable activities on the 
selected lands have not been sufficiently addressed.”90 Consequently, 
the EPA rated the DEIS as Environmental Objections-Insufficient 
Information (“EO-2”).91  
In June 1999, following public hearings on the DEIS and review 
of submitted comment letters, the BLM issued its final EIS, which 
differed only slightly from the DEIS.92 The final EIS elected to study 
in depth three alternatives: the “Buckeye Alternative” and the 
“Copper Butte Alternative,” which would each reduce the total 
acreage of the selected and offered lands, and the “No Action 
Alternative,” under which there would be no lands exchanged.93  
The final EIS also clearly stated that the “foreseeable uses of the 
selected lands are mining-related uses” and “are assumed to be the 
same for all alternatives” because Asarco held the majority of the 
mining claims and had the right to pursue mining-related 
development.94 Under this assumption, the final EIS contained only 
a general analysis of the environmental consequences of mining and 
no comparative analysis of consequences under the alternatives.95 
The BLM, in April 2000, issued a ROD which changed FLPMA 
designations for two then-existing Resource Management Plans 
(“RMPs”)96 and approved the proposed land exchange.97 Although 
 
 89. Id. at 1067–68. 
 90. Id. at 1068. 
 91. Id. (“We have strong objections to the proposed project because we believe there is 
potential for significant environmental degradation that could be corrected by project 
modification or other feasible alternatives . . . . We continue to contend that a substantial 
amount of information should be added to the EIS.”)  
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. It should be noted that the “No Action Alternative” (upper case) was the name 
given to the alternative in this EIS that analyzed impacts if no exchange of lands occurred. This 
is more specific than the general “no action alternative” (lower case) that is the general 
designation for the alternative in any EIS that analyzes the status quo. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 1068–69. 
 96. These changes from “retention” to “disposal” were critical prerequisites because 
they no longer required the BLM to manage the lands under FLPMA’s “multiple-use lands.” 
 97. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 581 F.3d at 1069. 
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FLPMA prohibits land exchanges unless the “public interest will be 
well served,”98 the ROD used slightly inverse logic by asserting that 
the exchange was justified because the public would not be harmed 
in any way as a result of conveying the land to private ownership.99 
Just as the final EIS assumed, the ROD also concluded that there 
would be no harm to the public interest because mining would occur 
under any alternative as well as in the absence of the land 
exchange.100 But this conclusion met opposition from the Sierra 
Club, the Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the EPA. 
Objections to the ROD, as summarized by the BLM, were that 
“[a] Mine Plan of Operation is necessary to complete analysis of the 
land exchange impacts” and that “BLM’s assumption is wrong that 
the foreseeable use reflects mining that would take place whether or 
not land exchange occurs.”101 The ROD failed to address these 
objections directly, instead only referring back to the final EIS.102 
However, the final EIS only addressed the first objection, the 
necessity of a Mine Plan of Operation (“MPO”), and not the 
objection that the “assumption” that the same mining would happen 
regardless was wrong.103 Despite this unanswered objection, the 
BLM considered the matter decided and concluded. 
B. Procedural History 
In July 2001, the Center for Biological Diversity, the Sierra 
Club, and the Western Land Exchange Project (“Environmental 
Groups”) filed both an administrative appeal and a request to stay 
the land exchange with the Interior Board of Land Appeals 
(“IBLA”). However, after the IBLA failed to act on the request 
within the statutorily required forty-five days,104 the Environmental 
Groups filed suit in federal district court.105 Shortly thereafter, the 
IBLA granted the request staying the exchange, pending its decision 
 
 98. 43 U.S.C. § 1716(a) (2006). 
 99. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 581 F.3d at 1069. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. The ROD cited final EIS General Response §§ 7.4.5 and 7.4.6 as having already 
addressed these objections. 
 103. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 581 F.3d at 1069. 
 104. 43 C.F.R. § 4.21(b)(4) (2001). 
 105. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 581 F.3d at 1069. 
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on the administrative appeal.106 The federal district court also agreed 
to suspend any proceedings, pending the IBLA’s decision.107 The 
IBLA eventually denied the Environmental Groups’ appeal in August 
2004 and the district court subsequently granted summary judgment 
in favor of the BLM, denying the Environmental Groups’ challenge 
to the land exchange.108 The Environmental Groups then appealed 
the decision of the federal district court to the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals.109 
C. The Court’s Analysis 
In the majority opinion, written by Judge Fletcher, two judges of 
a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court 
and held that the BLM failed to take a hard look at the proposed 
land exchange, thereby violating NEPA.110 Judge Tallman filed a 
dissenting opinion that challenged the majority opinion as having 
disregarded recent precedent.111 
1. Majority opinion 
The majority opinion focused predominately on the provisions 
within NEPA for the basis of its decision. In fact, the majority 
reaffirmed the standard of review under NEPA, stating that the court 
“must ensure that the agency has taken a ‘hard look’ at the 
environmental consequences of its proposed actions” and “must 
defer to an agency’s decision that is ‘fully informed and well-
considered.’”112 NEPA, as the majority pointed out, “establishes 
‘action-enforcing’ procedures that require agencies to take a ‘hard 
look’ at environmental consequences,”113 with the preparation of an 
EIS “[c]hief among” them.114 The court’s significant valuation of an 
 
 106. Id. at 1069–70. 
 107. Id. at 1070. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 1077 (Tallman, J., dissenting). 
 112. Id. at 1070 (majority opinion) (citing Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. 
Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted)). 
 113. Id. at 1071 (quoting Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(citation omitted)). 
 114. Id. 
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EIS is not new or unfounded.115 In addition to being statutorily 
required for federal actions that affect human environmental quality, 
the Supreme Court has also established two important purposes of 
an EIS. 
First, [i]t ensures that the agency, in reaching its decision, will have 
available, and will carefully consider, detailed information 
concerning significant environmental impacts. Second, it 
guarantees that the relevant information will be made available to 
the larger audience that may also play a role in both the 
decisionmaking process and the implementation of that decision.116 
While an EIS is the procedural mechanism to ensure that 
decisions and implementations are properly considered and well-
informed, the “analysis of alternatives to the proposed action is ‘the 
heart of the environmental impact statement’”117 and the “existence 
of reasonable but unexamined alternatives renders an EIS 
inadequate.”118 This reasoning frames the majority’s view of the facts 
of this case. Specifically, in order for the BLM and Asarco to have 
complied with NEPA, they must have adequately fulfilled the 
procedural requirement of an EIS by including an analysis of any 
existing “reasonable” alternatives to the proposed land exchange. 
The final EIS issued by the BLM did examine the environmental 
impacts and three alternatives, including the statutorily required “no 
action alternative,” which is intended to “provide a baseline” for 
evaluating the action alternative.119 Under the “no action 
alternative,” the land exchange would not occur. However, the 
majority concluded that the final EIS assumption—that the  
 
 
 
 
 115. See, e.g., Alaska Wilderness League v. Kempthorne, 548 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 116. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 768 (2004) (citations omitted). 
 117. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 581 F.3d at 1071 (quoting Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. 
Bureau of Land Mgmt., 531 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008)). The term “heart of the 
environmental impact statement” is actually originally quoted from 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 
(2009). 
 118. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 581 F.3d at 1071 (quoting Friends of Se.’s Future v. 
Morrison, 153 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
 119. Id. at 1071 (quoting Friends, 153 F.3d at 1065). “A no action alternative in an EIS 
allows policymakers and the public to compare the environmental consequences of the status 
quo to the consequences of the proposed action.” Id. 
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environmental consequences of the land exchange and the no action 
alternative would be the same—was improper and “fatally 
undermined the analysis in the final EIS.”120 
The BLM’s “assumption” was largely based on mining claims 
already held by Asarco and the guarantee of the right to engage in 
mining on those lands under the Mining Law of 1872.121 Because 
Asarco already held claims on much of the land, the final EIS largely 
assumed that “mining” would occur in the same manner with or 
without the land exchange.122 However, the majority did not jump 
to the same conclusion. The majority pointed out that if the lands 
were retained in the public’s hands, the mining activities of Asarco 
would be subject to provisions of the Mining Law of 1872 that 
would require Asarco to submit MPOs to the BLM and receive 
approval for any operations “greater than a ‘casual use’ that would 
disturb more than five acres of land.”123  
Under the proposed land exchange, however, Asarco would have 
owned the lands in fee simple and would not have been subject to 
the same stringent MPO requirements of the Mining Law.124 The 
majority thought it “highly likely” that the MPO process would 
“substantially” impact the mining operations on the lands.125 
Moreover, the majority pointed out that the record126 indicated that 
both Asarco and the BLM have fairly specific and detailed knowledge 
about Asarco’s intentions for the exchanged lands and that such 
knowledge would be useful in preparing a final EIS that would 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 1071–72; see also United States v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 
1999); Independence Mining Co. v. Babbit, 105 F.3d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 122. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 581 F.3d at 1072. 
 123. Id. (citing 43 C.F.R. §§ 3809.11, 3809.21 (2010)). Casual use is defined as 
“activities ordinarily resulting in no or negligible disturbance of the public lands or resources.” 
43 C.F.R. § 3809.5 (2010). 
 124. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 581 F.3d at 1072. 
 125. Id. at 1073. 
 126. The majority cites to several sources indicating Asarco and the BLM’s knowledge. 
First, a 1999 EPA letter to the BLM, which objected to the DEIS, claimed that there seemed 
to be “fairly specific plans for the selected parcels.” Id. at 1074. Second, a separate concurrence 
of Administrative Judge Hammer in the IBLA decision, who noted that she was agitated by 
the claim that the “foreseeable consequences . . . are not possible to predict or are speculative” 
and that BLM’s information should have “made foreseeable impacts more easily presentable.” 
Id. And finally, the BLM’s final EIS itself included specific information regarding the intended 
activities, as well as the amount of land dedicated to each. Id. 
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analyze the likely MPOs that Asarco would submit under the no 
action alternative.127 
The “black letter law” of NEPA mandates comparative analysis 
of environmental impacts of the alternatives available to the agency, 
and for the EIS to satisfy NEPA, an agency such as the BLM must 
give “meaningful analysis of the likely environmental consequences 
of the proposed exchange by comparing the likely environmental 
consequences of mining under a regime of approved MPOs with the 
likely environmental consequences of mining on the lands without 
the constraints of the MPO process.”128 Quite simply, the majority 
pointed out, the “BLM has not done this,” nor “even attempted to 
do this.”129 The BLM “improperly assumed” that the MPO process 
would have no effect and simplified the likely consequences under 
each alternative as both “mining” and “mining.”130 Because the 
BLM assumes that the mining under any alternative would yield the 
same consequences, the majority concluded that such an assumption 
is not only unsupported by the evidence, but it “flies in the face of 
the evidence in the record.”131 Therefore, the BLM violated the 
requirements of NEPA because it failed “to take a ‘hard look’ at the 
environmental consequences of the land exchange.”132 
2. Judge Tallman’s dissent 
In a strong dissent, Judge Tallman asserted that the majority had 
“inverted”133 proper legal analysis, made “fundamental missteps”134 
in its analysis, and inappropriately expanded NEPA’s procedural 
requirements, thereby making the decision “irreconcilable with 
Lands Council,” and showing that the majority “disregard[ed] that 
precedent.”135 Judge Tallman stressed several ways that this sort of 
“judicial second-guessing” by the majority is wrong and is exactly 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 1075. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 1078 (Tallman, J., dissenting). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 1077. 
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what the en banc court was attempting to “rein in” in Lands 
Council.136 
  
 a. An inverted legal analysis. First, the dissent reasoned that the 
majority had “work[ed] backwards,” inverting its legal analysis in 
such a way that it has created bad law.137 Asarco already possessed 
claims on almost the entirety of the proposed lands and it was 
FLPMA that governed the exchange, with NEPA as a procedural 
mechanism that factors into the BLM’s determination under 
FLPMA. Instead, the dissent pointed out that the majority focused 
almost exclusively on NEPA with FLPMA and the Mining Law 
consideration only being addressed “tangentially.”138 This inversion 
of analysis did not give proper weight to what Judge Tallman 
contended to be the primary issues: serving the public interest and 
preexisting mining rights.139  
FLPMA allows the BLM to exchange lands provided that “the 
public interest will be well served by making the exchange” and 
while impact on the environment is “certainly a factor” in the public 
interest determination by the BLM under FLPMA, NEPA only sets 
forth the procedures required of agencies in considering the 
environmental impact of their actions and “does not dictate 
substantive results.”140 The dissent therefore stressed that the public 
interest determination of FLPMA is paramount, and accordingly a 
NEPA evaluation serves as a factor—“unquestionably an important 
one”141—within the evaluation of that public interest, but it is not 
dispositive as a single deficiency within an EIS cannot be “sufficient 
to undermine” an agency action.142 Additionally, the dissent also 
gave several positive benefits derived from this type of land exchange 
both generally and specifically to this case.143 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 1078. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 1079–80. 
 140. Id. at 1079. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 1078–79. 
 143. Id. at 1079. 
[Consolidated] lands can be managed efficiently, effectively, and economically 
for all sorts of beneficial uses—e.g., creation of parklands, wilderness areas, 
hiking and biking trails, environmental remediation and protection, or 
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The weight given to the Mining Law in the dissent is more 
driven by a notion of “practicality” than the straightforward 
relationship of FLPMA to NEPA.144 This practicality stems from the 
fact that Asarco holds over 99% of the mining or mill site claims that 
encumber the entire selected lands.145 Possession of a mining claim is 
not just an abstraction, but an “owner of a mining claim owns 
property.”146 Moreover, not only are they entitled to “casual use” 
and development of the claims under the Mining Law of 1872, but 
Asarco can even apply for a patent on the land, which conveys fee 
title to the applicant if approved.147 Proper consideration, according 
to the dissent, must therefore be first given to the mining rights that 
“predate the Land Exchange proposal, and will exist whether or not 
the Land Exchange goes forward.”148 
 
b. A series of fundamental missteps. The second error pointed to 
in the dissent was “a series of fundamental missteps” made by the 
majority. Specifically, the majority first misinterpreted the record to 
view that the BLM “blindly assumed” that the mining on the lands 
would be exactly the same. Second, the majority then made an 
“apparent finding of fact for the first time on appeal” that the BLM 
and Asarco had “detailed knowledge” and withheld this from the 
public. Finally, the majority built upon “these two highly 
questionable appellate findings” to improperly broaden NEPA to 
create a new “procedural hurdle.”149 These missteps are underscored 
by the dissent’s enunciation of the “arbitrary and capricious”150 
 
improved stewardship of multiple-use lands and forests. It is undisputed [this 
exchange] would serve these very purposes, among others.  
Id. “[F]rom and environmental standpoint, the selected lands are far inferior to the 
offered lands which would come under federal ownership through the Land 
Exchange. . . . Moreover, the less environmentally valuable selected lands . . . are 
apparently rich in copper and silver—minerals in high demand by our technology-
driven economy.” 
Id. at 1079–80 n.3. 
 144. Id. at 1080–81. 
 145. Id. at 1081; see also id. at 1067 (majority opinion). 
 146. Id. at 1080 (Tallman, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 
1093, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
 147. Id. at 1080; see also 30 U.S.C. § 29 (2006). 
 148. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 581 F.3d at 1081. 
 149. Id. at 1078. 
 150. See 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) (2006). The dissent also points out that agency decisions 
can only be arbitrary and capricious when: 
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standard, which authorizes and constrains the court’s review of 
agency action.151  
The dissent recognized that the majority did not dispute the 
foreseeability of mining activities nor propose an alternative 
foreseeable use for the lands, and did not fault them for that. 
Instead, it faulted the majority for misreading “the BLM’s careful 
analysis” and fixating on an isolated phrase152 in the record to 
indicate the BLM’s assumption “that the manner and intensity of 
mining would be ‘the same’ whether or not there was a land 
exchange.”153 The dissent asserted that this phrase from the EIS was 
taken “entirely out of context” because it was intended to 
demonstrate that a no mining alternative was unrealistic and 
impracticable.154 The dissent instead contended that the manner and 
intensity of mining activity presumed in the BLM’s environmental 
assessment was based on “the assumption that mining-related activity 
[in the absence of the exchange] . . . would be conducted in a 
manner consistent with Asarco’s existing mining rights.”155  
The next “misstep” by the majority came with the assumption 
that the BLM and Asarco had “detailed knowledge” about the 
intention. The dissent objected to the majority’s “hypothetical” 
claim that Asarco’s mining will “differ substantially,” depending on 
whether or not there is a land exchange because it is 
“unaccompanied by any factual basis from the record” and “NEPA 
does not encompass all conceivable scenarios.”156 Moreover, the 
dissent attempted to deflate “an inflated portrayal of the MPO 
process” held by the majority.157 As a properly submitted MPO can 
only be denied by the BLM for resulting in “unnecessary or undue 
 
the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, 
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an 
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is 
so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of 
agency expertise. 
Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 581 F.3d at 1081 (quoting Sw. Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. 
U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443, 1448 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
 151. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 581 F.3d at 1081. 
 152. “As explained above, foreseeable uses of the selected lands are assumed to be the 
same for all alternatives.” Id. 
 153. Id. at 1082. 
 154. Id. at 1083. 
 155. Id.  
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
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degradation of public lands,”158 the most significant controls in effect 
on the lands would be the federal regulations and safeguards that still 
bind private land owners159 and were considered in the BLM’s final 
EIS.160 The BLM evaluated the likely developments, but because an 
MPO is not required for a proposed land exchange, specificity was 
not needed and the majority’s determination, according to the 
dissent, was therefore conjecture and not based on facts in the 
record.161 
The final misstep was the majority’s creation of a new NEPA 
requirement. The dissent argued that by seeking a discussion of 
MPO-related environmental impacts under the no action alternative, 
the majority created a “quasi-MPO requirement” of agencies under 
NEPA that is both “steeped in mystery” and without “legal basis.”162 
This regulation of agency action “by judicial fiat” is inappropriate 
because it imposes the court’s “own notion of which procedures are 
‘best’”163 and “procedural requirements not explicitly 
enumerated”164 in NEPA.165 And by intervening with the decision 
making ability of agencies in this way, the dissent contended that 
that the majority opinion therefore ran counter to the court’s 
precedent.166 
 
c. Irreconcilable with precedent. Finally, the dissent maintained 
that the majority defied precedent, not only with its creation and 
application of a “novel, judicially created NEPA requirement,”167 but 
more generally in its failure to “defer to an agency’s determination in 
an area involving a ‘high level of expertise.’”168 The BLM, the dissent 
would argue, has the specialized knowledge and expertise in the area 
of mining rights and MPOs, such that they are the best to evaluate 
 
 158. 43 C.F.R. § 3809.411(d)(3). 
 159. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
7413 (2006). 
 160. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 581 F.3d at 1084. 
 161. Id. at 1085. 
 162. Id. at 1085–86. 
 163. Id. at 1086 (quoting Churchill County v. Norton, 276 F.3d 1060, 1072 (9th Cir. 
2001)). 
 164. Id. (quoting Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 993 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 1086. 
 167. Id. at 1078. 
 168. Id. at 1086 (quoting Lands Council, 537 F.3d at 993). 
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the potential consequence if the status quo was maintained. Indeed, 
the dissent pointed out that BLM considered a “Mining Plan of 
Operation Alternative,”169 gave “meaningful discussion” on the 
foreseeable usage of the land,170 weighed the inevitability of 
“mining-related activities” burdening the land,171 and presented 
“sound logic” in the ROD on how best to serve the public 
interest.172 The dissent plainly accused the majority of being 
“concerned about the unavoidable uncertainty regarding the 
ultimate environmental impacts that will occur,” basing their ruling 
“entirely on their suspicion,” and effectively “sacrific[ing] the 
integrity of [the court’s] precedent and the best interests of the 
public in order to achieve a particular outcome.”173 Specifically, the 
majority’s opinion “embodies the type of judicial meddling in agency 
action that we intended to put to rest in Lands Council.”174 
IV. PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER: CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL 
DIVERSITY AS CLARIFICATION RATHER THAN CONTRADICTION 
The majority’s decision serves as a congruent and apposite 
clarification of the Ninth Circuit’s expectations for a “hard look.” 
Ultimately the primary challenge leveled by Judge Tallman’s dissent 
is that the decision in Center for Biological Diversity is blatantly 
counter to Ninth Circuit precedent. Arguably, inverted legal analysis 
and missteps of the majority aside, the dissent would have the 
majority overturned and the land exchange approved based on 
precedent alone because the BLM made the determination that the 
exchange would best serve the public interest, and under Lands 
Council the court must defer to agency determination in technical 
areas. In other words, the court’s analysis and missteps should never 
be reached because precedent mandates an affirmation of the action.  
Moreover, it would seem that the dissent adamantly believed that 
this case creates such a rift with precedent that it is completely 
“irreconcilable.”175 However, looking beyond the scope of Lands 
Council shows that majority decision in Center for Biological 
 
 169. Id. at n.7. 
 170. Id. at n.8. 
 171. Id. at 1088. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 1088–89. 
 174. Id. at 1090. 
 175. Id. at 1077. 
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Diversity is not only an appropriate and fitting refinement to the 
court’s analysis of agency actions—further clarifying the role of the 
judiciary in ensuring that agencies take the requisite “hard look” at 
environmental impact—but it also affirms standing Ninth Circuit 
precedent beyond that enunciated in Lands Council. 
A. Alternatives and Purpose Cannot Be Too Narrowly Focused 
In Robertson v. Methow and Friends of Southeast’s Future v. 
Morrison, the court criticized narrowness in both the presentation of 
alternatives and even the underlying purpose of the proposed action. 
The problem in Methow was that the forest service narrowed all 
alternatives to consider only a single parcel, and an EIS that does not 
present sufficient alternatives to achieve the underlying public need is 
incomplete.176 The court faced a similarly narrow set of alternatives 
in Center for Biological Diversity. Undoubtedly, as the dissent 
pointed out, mining on the lands was inevitable. However, what was 
not inevitable was the “manner and intensity of mining” that would 
occur, depending on whether the land exchange took place.  
While the majority was criticized for “the unavoidable 
uncertainty,” which the dissent admitted “could be substantial and 
perhaps different than estimated in the EIS,” it seems that the reason 
it questioned the alternatives presented was specifically because the 
majority did not believe the uncertainty was completely unavoidable. 
In fact, ensuring that the agency “will have available and will 
carefully consider, detailed information concerning significant 
environmental impact” is precisely one of the purposes of an EIS 
according to the Supreme Court.177 Omitting alternatives from the 
EIS, even if carefully considered and dismissed by an agency, also 
circumvents the second purpose of an EIS—guaranteeing that “the 
relevant information will be made available to the larger 
audience.”178 The BLM cannot claim that it evaluated the mining 
under the no action alternative off-the-record and dismissed the 
significance of its impact. Regardless of the agency’s intentions, the 
narrow presentation of alternatives makes an EIS incomplete. 
 
 
 176. See supra Part II.A. 
 177. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 768 (2004). 
 178. Id. 
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In Friends179 the underlying purpose and need of the Alaskan 
timber project was defined so narrowly that the no action alternative 
was omitted because it failed to fulfill that purpose and need. In 
Center for Biological Diversity, the BLM did not go so far as to omit 
the no action alternative from the EIS. In fact, the mining and 
private development that could occur under the no action alternative 
weighed in on the BLM’s decision. However, the objective of the 
proposed land exchange could be construed as being so 
“unreasonably narrow” that it precluded the acceptance of a no 
action alternative, effectively omitting it from consideration despite 
inclusion in the EIS. If the desired benefits or purpose of the 
proposed land exchange are so narrow that the no action alternative 
is rendered unreasonable, the effect is much the same as if the 
alternative was completely omitted. The court can exercise 
discretion, as it did in Friends,180 in evaluating the sufficiency of the 
no action alternative to ensure that the EIS process is not 
circumvented. However, as these examples indicate, precedent alone 
does not mandate that the court automatically affirm agency 
decisions, particularly when there are narrow alternatives or purposes 
at play in the proposed action. 
B. Underlying Purpose Is Central to Examining Treatment of No 
Action Alternatives 
Friends also speaks to the importance of considering the purpose 
of the action when examining the agency’s handling of the no action 
alternative. In Center for Biological Diversity, the consolidation of 
lands, even if for the basis of more “efficiently, effectively, and 
economically” managed lands, seems to quite obviously preclude a 
no action alternative.181 The ROD points to several specific benefits 
derived from exchanging the apparently “mediocre” selected lands 
for the “superior” offered lands,182 but there is no mention in the 
record of any benefits, meeting the underlying purpose or otherwise, 
that would be derived from retaining the lands under a no action 
alternative.  
 
 179. See supra Part II.C. 
 180. 153 F.3d at 1066. 
 181. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Dep’t of Interior, 581 F.3d 1063, 1079–80 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
 182. Id. at 1089. 
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As stated above, under Friends the court has the discretion to 
evaluate the treatment of a no action alternative but in the context of 
the underlying purpose. In other words, the court must first look to 
the underlying purpose of the proposed action and then, provided 
the objectives are not “unreasonably narrow,” the court can decide if 
the treatment of a no action alternative is appropriate, considering 
that underlying purpose and its congruence with the requirements of 
NEPA. Therefore, the court is well within its discretion to make 
determinations on both the overarching objective of the proposed 
land exchange and adequacy of the no action alternative within the 
EIS, which in this case it found inadequately addressed the difference 
between the proposed exchange and the status quo.183  
C. The “Hard Look” Must Be Demonstrated 
In both Blue Mountain Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood184 and 
Ecology Center, Inc. v. Austin185 the court specified that the “hard 
look” at environmental impacts required of agencies must actually be 
demonstrated. According to Blue Mountain, the court looks for 
evidence of more than a “cursory” investigation into impacts and the 
persuasiveness of the agency’s determination as presented in the EIS. 
The court in Center for Biological Diversity was therefore well within 
its authority to evaluate the information—including the 
persuasiveness—contained within the issued statements and 
assessments and then base its decision on the adequacy of the EIS in 
fulfilling the “hard look” requirement. Moreover, the evaluation of 
the “hard look” does not require an examination of the potential 
benefits or public interest because “NEPA is a procedural 
mechanism,”186 and the injection of a subjective valuation of benefits 
would be misplaced. Instead, the court only looks at the required 
steps the agency has taken and whether those steps—such as a 
complete EIS with a “full and fair discussion”187 of all the reasonable 
alternatives—have been adequately fulfilled. Even “a single 
exception” to its thoroughness ought to be sufficient to render an 
EIS incomplete, especially when every EIS must “[r]igorously 
 
 183. Friends, 153 F.3d at 1066; see also Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. BLM, 586 
F.3d 735, 748 (9th Cir. 2009) (recently reaffirming the holding and analysis of Friends). 
 184. See supra Part II.B. 
 185. See supra Part II.D. 
 186. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 581 F.3d at 1086 (Tallman, J., dissenting). 
 187. 40 C.F.R. 1502.1. 
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explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives.”188 A 
failure to adhere to the procedural requirements at any stage is still a 
failure, regardless of any beneficial outcome of the action. 
Additionally, the internal machinations of agencies cannot rise to the 
level of a demonstration of the hard look to the court either, as the 
court does not conclude that the “hard look” at the environmental 
impacts was taken simply because the agency says there’s little to no 
significant impact.189 Accordingly, the majority was correct in 
dismissing the BLM’s claim that it thoroughly explored the no 
action alternative beyond what was published in any EIS. Again, an 
EIS ensures that the agency has and considers detailed information 
as well as guarantees that such information is available to the public. 
Agencies must demonstrate taking the “hard look” through their 
issued assessments and statements. And when part of that 
information is missing, it logically cannot be considered “fully 
informed and well-considered.” 
Ecology Center goes even further than Blue Mountain in 
specifying that the “hard look” must be demonstrated in the 
scientific methodology as well. In its short life, Ecology Center called 
into question the scientific methodologies utilized by agencies in 
arriving at their decisions, calling for demonstration that not only did 
agency discussion of the impacts demonstrate that they took the 
“hard look,” but that the techniques used to support their discussion 
also conform to a “hard look.”190 It was this extension of the 
“demonstration” required of agencies under NEPA that the court 
eventually retreated from in Lands Council. But while Lands Council 
unmistakably snuffed out the requirement of demonstration in 
scientific procedure, it did not eliminate the need for agency 
demonstration of taking the “hard look” as established by Blue 
Mountain. 
D. The “Hard Look” Only Examines the Discussion, Not the Science 
Ecology Center was clearly a shocking turn in “hard look” 
precedent because it added “overly zealous scrutiny” to the 
 
 188. 40 C.F.R. 1502.14(a). 
 189. Blue Mountain Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 
1998) (quoting Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest Serv., 137 F.3d 1372 (9th Cir. 
1998)). 
 190. See generally Ecology Ctr. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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demonstration required of agencies.191 But while Ecology Center was 
a faulty standard that swung the burden too far in the direction of 
agencies, it would be error to suppose that Lands Council swings it 
just as far in the opposite direction. In Lands Council, the NEPA 
violation asserted by Lands Council, and affirmed by the prior three-
judge panel, is not regarding a deficiency of the EIS, but a failure by 
the Forest Service to address “scientific uncertainties” around its 
strategy or provide evidence as to how its strategy would accomplish 
its objective.192 In Center for Biological Diversity there is no question 
about scientific uncertainties or strategy, just what the majority finds 
to be an absence of a complete consideration of all reasonable 
alternatives. Perhaps Lands Council would be more directly fitting if 
the Environmental Groups challenged a determination or estimation 
produced by the BLM that projected the environmental impacts of 
the no action alternative. However, that is not the case here. Instead, 
the challenge presented in Center for Biological Diversity is that the 
BLM gives insufficient information and discussion on the 
environmental consequences under the no action alternative, not 
that the BLM’s use of scientific techniques or methods were 
deficient.  
The deference owed agencies is in areas with a “high level of 
technical expertise,”193 as the court is certainly made up of non-
scientists, and yet even in the area of scientific methodology, 
agencies must respond to and address concerns, uncertainties, or 
objections—through an EIS—in congruence with the requirements 
of NEPA. Lands Council does not signify a shift to absolute agency 
deference, but is a return to agency deference on the science and 
internal regulations behind proposed actions. Center for Biological 
Diversity in no way contrasts this, but reaffirms the requirement, 
established in Blue Mountains and underlying Lands Council, that 
calls for “fully informed and well-considered” discussion of 
environmental impacts to demonstrate that the agency has taken the 
“hard look.” If the discussion demonstrated in the issued statements 
and assessments is deficient in part, logically the court can find that 
the agency’s look at environmental impacts is simply not “hard” 
enough. 
 
 191. See supra Part II.D 
 192. Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 1002 (9th Cir. 2008); see supra Part II.E. 
 193. Lands Council, 537 F.3d at 993. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The decision in Center for Biological Diversity is not the radical 
departure from precedent that Judge Tallman’s dissent suggests, nor 
is it incorrect for failing to focus on the benefits to the public 
interest. The majority accurately looks dispassionately at the 
procedural steps, resulting assessments, and statements in order to 
find that the BLM violated NEPA by failing to take the hard look at 
the environmental impacts. Furthermore, scrutiny of several key 
Ninth Circuit decisions leading up to and including Lands Council 
show that Center for Biological Diversity is a further clarification of 
the court’s evaluation of how “hard” an agency must look at 
consequences and when the court can find that the agency’s 
determination of environmental impacts has been too soft to be 
considered a “hard look.” 
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